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The self in social work
Adam Barnard1
Social work has a long and significant history in the use of the ‘self’. The first part of this paper is 
a contextualising discussion around recent reforms to social work. The second part is a historical 
examination of the conceptualisation of the self in the contemporary era. This discussion is intimately 
wedded to notions of identity, ‘social’ and conceptions of the self. This discussion will review the major 
philosophical understandings of self, before examining the ‘self’ in social work. Recently social workers 
have developed the term ‘use of self’ to indicate important aspects of the professional relationship and 
how this term is defined rests on how one conceptualises ‘self’.
The final part of the paper will examine how social workers describe and involve the self that they 
bring to their therapeutic and non-therapeutic work. Participants in case-study, narrative accounts 
describe the self that they bring to their work as individualistic although at the same time stress the 
relational, positioned, relationship-based self. This examination carries the concept of the self from 
the notion of self as separate and constant to the self as a process in interaction.
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Introduction
The changing nature of social work is considered a positive ‘moment’ as a challenge 
to re-establish the value base and transfer knowledge and skills and practice and 
management to a variety of different settings (Johnson and Williams 2007:117). It is 
only through trustworthy, strong, knowledgeable and skill-based relationships with 
clients and others can social workers help clients reach their goals (McCoyd 2010: 
1). A relationship based notion of self in dialogue with service users and valuing 
their experience can establish relational security that has found favour as a concept 
in secure mental health settings by the Department of Health (2010, 2010a), the 
Munro review of Child Protection report (Munro 2011) and in interpersonal relations 
(Adams and Jones 1999).
The following part of the paper examines competing and contested uses of self 
in helping professions. It starts with a historical examination of the emergence of 
conceptions of the self in Western, predominantly philosophical, thought. Descartes, 
Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche are considered to gain purchase of the conception of 
self (Burkitt, 2008). The rise of the ‘psy of self’ adds a further dimension to how the 
emergent conception of the self has gained a form of institutional recognition. Finally, 
Foucault’s contribution of the technologies employed on the self are discussed. These 
discussions position conceptions of the self in relation to contemporary developments 
in professional practice.
The latter part of the paper views the use of self in social work. Contested 
images and representations of the self in the literature on the helping professions 
are examined and three avenues are presented. The first is the way social work has 
responded to conceptions of the self as a form of ‘use of the self’ from a relational 
and relationship-based perspective. The second is the ‘consciousness of the self as 
an instrument for intervention’. The third is illustrative of a disassembled self as 
part of a learning process. These forms of self, contribute to work-based learning in 
social work practice.
Context
Social Work as a profession has undergone significant scrutiny and change over the 
last decade. For example, professional registration and new Code of Practice are being 
enshrined in legislation and there have been an important debates in an attempting 
to identity, clarify and explore the role of social work and its value in society (Bogg 
2010; CSIP/NIMHE 2006; Parrot 2006; Merchant 2007; Ray et al 2008; Scottish 
Executive 2006, DoH 2007). The Social Work Task Force (Social Work Task Force 
2009a, 2009b) was established as a joint initiative between the Department of Health 
and the Department of Children, Schools and Families to undertake a system wide 
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review of social work practice and to make recommendations for improvement and 
reform of the whole profession. One of the recommendations was the creation of an 
independent national college of social work (Social Work Task force 2009b) developed 
and led by social workers although financed through membership. Social Work as a 
profession has now merged with social care and education, with closer structural ties 
between health and social care within adult services and social work and education 
for work with children, young people and families (Johnson and Williams 2007:118).
The Task Force’s comprehensive review has added weight, urgency and significance 
to attempts of definition of social work such as the definition of the International 
Association of Schools of Social Work and International Federation of Social workers 
(2011) suggests that
The social work profession promotes social change, problem solving in human 
relationships and the empowerment and liberation of people to enhance well-being. 
Utilising theories of human behaviour and social systems, social work intervenes at 
the points where people interact with their environments. Principles of human rights 
and social justice are fundamental to social work.
To achieve this, Johnson and Williams (2007:122) suggest tomorrow’s ‘social 
worker does not need to a ‘strongly bonded individual with a sense of self apart 
from others’ but, instead, someone who values and connects with others, using the 
multiplicity of experiences of service users and team members to develop adaptive 
and creative solutions’. This connected fluidity of relationship based notions of self 
to achieve rights and justice will be discussed in the paper.
The National Occupational Standards (NOS) set for social workers clearly state 
that understandings of the self are central to competence. There is a large focus 
upon the journeys of the self to competence by meeting a set of levelled criteria to 
demonstrate competence. The General Social Care Council suggests in its codes of 
conducts that social workers must: protect the rights and promote the interests of 
service users and carers; strive to establish and maintain the trust and confidence of 
service users and carers; promote the independence of service users while protecting 
them as far as possible from danger or harm; respect the rights of service users whilst 
seeking to ensure that their behaviour does not harm themselves or other people; 
uphold public trust and confidence in social care services; and be accountable for 
the quality of their work and take responsibility for maintaining and improving their 
knowledge and skills. Although not explicitly focused on the ‘self’ core precepts such 
as responsibility for maintaining on-going development carry significant implications 
for the self in social work.
Social Work reform board, the College of Social Work and National Occupational 
Standards provide an orientation to this discussion and prioritises the need to locate 
discussions of self in the process of social work.
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Conceptions of the self
The self has had contemporary expression from the ancient Hellenistic and Roman 
thought (Gill, 2006), to a technologically mediated self (Jones, 2006), to being 
mirrored in the home (Marcus, 2006). There is a wide and varied literature on the self 
that reflects the rise and concern with identity, self-identity and its relationship to self 
(Elliott, 2007; du Gay 2007; Elliott & du Gay, 2009). The seminal works on the self 
with rich, detailed and extended reflections of the self are found with Siegel (2005) 
and Taylor (1989). The self is anchored in conflicting discourses and competing 
dialogues and is shaped and formed in the discursive apparatus in which it is evoked. 
Indeed, contemporary deconstructive readings of the idea of the self in works such 
as Siegel’s (2005) comprehensive guide certainly mitigate against any finality of 
definition. However, a historical (if partial, selective and limited) consideration of 
the contribution of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche are considered to gain 
purchase of the conception of self using the work of Burkitt (2008).
Western notions of the self have emerged from diverse and contradictory social , 
political and cultural strands from Roman legal theory, Greco-Roman Stoic philosophy, 
Christian theology and the metaphysical soul as kind of self-substance to the advent 
of industrial capitalism (Burkitt, 2008: 25). Descartes contribution in Discourse on 
Method is that we identify our existence through mental reflection on our own selves. 
‘I think therefore I am’ posits knowledge as a construct of the human mind and a 
way of representing the world that extends beyond the individual (Burkitt, 2008: 6). 
Through a radical doubt of everything we know including the evidence of the senses 
he concludes that ‘I was a substance ... so that this ‘I’, that is to say, the mind, by 
which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body’ (Descartes, 1968 [1637]:53). 
From Descartes the ‘self’ becomes a thinking substance, of the non-material mind 
and material body, with a ‘transcendental self’ beyond the finite experience of the 
embodied individual. Burkitt (2008: 7) suggests the self embedded in Western thought 
becomes the bifurcation of the rational beings for whom the mind is paramount 
for Enlightenment rationalists or irrational beings ruled by bodily passions of 
the Romantics. Charles Taylor (1989) has argued that the ‘expressivist’ Romantic 
Movement in 18th century European society understood the self as something to be 
made through an individual’s creative expression in his history of the self. Kenny 
(1968) argues Descartes introduces two selves against a transcendental self by the 
‘I’ that thinks and the ‘I’ that is. This dualism cannot account for the ability to bring 
together diverse modes of existence and a thinking and feeling embodied individual 
who lives in a particular place and time with life experiences and social relations and 
relationships. Alternative histories can be written from other cultural perspectives 
such as Confucianism and Buddhism (Elvin, 1985).
Kant’s Enlightenment rationalism of the Critique of Pure Reason (1966 [1781]) 
recognised that humans are natural beings that have sensations of the world that 
provide information along with desires, needs and inclinations that mitigate against 
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reason (Seigel, 2005) so that the rational mind does not solely define the self. Kant 
concludes that reason must be a priori or prior to experience of embodied individuals 
to consist of the principles of reason and categories of thought to make ordered 
experience of the world possible (Kroner, 1955). Burkitt (2008) suggests Kant has 
three senses of self. First, the transcendental self that is capable of rational thought 
and can abstract itself from embodied social, cultural and historical circumstance, to 
be guided by a priori principles or the ‘pure ray of apperception that shines out its 
beam of light on the darkness and chaos of the world’ (Burkitt, 2008: 3). Second is 
the embodied self who puts rationality into practical action. Thirdly, Kant has the self 
in moral law that has a capacity to follow moral imperatives rather than individual 
desire. Seigel (2005) suggests there is a tension between how these selves interrelate 
in order to achieve unity in experience. The third ‘self’ of following moral imperatives 
guides social work through the guidance offered by General Social Care Council, 
National Occupational Standards and statutory social work.
Following Descartes and Kant there is strong thread of Western thought that 
locates the self firmly in the inner world of the individual that can then relate to 
society, social relations, and ‘others’, from the conflicted security of a centred self. 
This externalising reaching out of the inner subjective self to a social self resonates 
through the conception of the self in contemporary society.
Hegel’s dialectical philosophy of becoming sees contradiction, opposition, 
difference and conflict as the drive to achieve unity or resolution of contradiction 
at a higher level of becoming. Charting the historical emergence of the self, people 
become self-conscious and aware of the possibility of a degree of self-making. The 
contradictions the self experiences, such as between thought and feeling, reason and 
passion, society and self, universal and particular, offer the possibility of synthesis at 
a higher stage. The alienated self is an unhappy consciousness aware of its present 
life but also its unrealised potential. The self is always in the process of becoming 
resolving contradictions through a process of reconstruction. Burkitt (2008: 13) 
suggests Hegel’s major achievement is to understand humans as social beings while 
retaining a notion of self as an individual in their own right but also as a product of 
a dialectical historical process. As such, we have a relational understanding of the 
creation of the individual self, in the totality of relations that exist as a matrix in 
which we are constituted as selves.
Nietzsche rejected the idea that the self-conscious ‘I’ could be placed at the 
centre of human understanding. In The Gay Science (1974 [1882]) Nietzsche argued 
consciousness is the most unfinished and weakest part of the self that is charged 
with mediating the instincts, turning inward to look at ourselves and to deepen our 
self-analysis, to guard against our own desire (Burkitt, 2008: 13). This exercise of 
the ‘will to power’ creates the desire to dominate our own selves and other selves. 
For Nietzsche, we mistakenly believe that our identities and notion of self reside 
in our conscious part of the self. The solution for Nietzsche is represented in the 
ideal of the Übermensch or transcended, upper or over ‘man’. This is the ideal that a 
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true self has yet to achieve and can only be achieved by an individual who can tame 
their own desires and passions, and tame the chaos and destruction in the world 
and affirm it all asserting joy rather than fear. These individuals can free themselves 
from a collective morality and create themselves as a work of art like Goethe or 
Picasso. This positive affirmation is a call to self assertion that has been co-opted 
in ideologically motivated readings of Nietzsche. Burkitt (2008: 14) argues this 
challenged the emerging conceptualisation of the self in the West by rejecting the 
ordering of the self as a physical or a metaphysical substance.
For Marx (1990 [1848]), the social world and society is the totality of relations 
in which the self is constituted. This is located with an historical, socio-economic 
position so that social relations constitute the self as an individual located in a social 
framework. Capitalism alienates us from our true social and co-operative self in a 
practical and political project that would liberate the self from the fetters of a self 
made in conditions not of an individuals’ choosing.
Burkitt (2008) argues that to understand ourselves we must first abandon the 
image of ourselves as self-contained monads or self-possessed individuals searching 
for some identifying essence within that is the secret truth of self. Similarly, we are not 
individuals who are the proprietors of our own inherent capacities that owe nothing 
to society or to others. We are born into social relations that have been historically 
made so we are situated and embodied individuals in a context not of our choosing. 
Individual selves are formed from within times and places of contemporary capitalist 
societies (Burkitt 2008: 189).
Authoring of self is a process and a practice that is constrained and enabled by 
material and interpersonal situations. Burkitt (2008: 190) argues we are particular 
selves informed by social worlds, the people to whom we are related, and with 
dispositions, tastes, interests and desires that guide, influence and shape our choices 
and actions. In this way, through exploration of these composite and conflicting selves 
we can approximate a unified self, a feeling of a centre to our being, of existing as ‘I’ 
in the world although never unified, unchanging or without contradiction, amidst a 
clamour of voices. Burkitt (2008: 190) suggests ‘this is a core self that is never entirely 
sure of itself, never completed, always in the process of some degree of change, and 
open to the possibility of reconstruction’. Nevertheless, there are continuities and 
consistency in ourselves such as self-sustaining relationships like love and friendship, 
and some stable dispositional tendencies on which we act in a changing world. 
Giddens (1991) arrives at similar findings by charting the interrelationship of self 
and social relationships.
The intersection of self and social relations has been ably demonstrated and charted 
by Rose (1990). He provides a history of the self to conclude that we have a current 
regime of the self, in part constructed by psychology’s rise of profoundly ambiguous 
relations between the ethics of subjectivity, the truth of psychology and the exercise of 
power. Psychology as form of knowledge, a type of expertise, and a ground for ethics 
governs subjectivity and self in the contemporary era. The conception of self has 
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changed from autonomous, atomised self to a new individualised or enterprising self.
For Rose (1990) the image of an ‘enterprising self’, was so potent because it was 
not an idiosyncratic obsession of the right of the political spectrum, to the contrary, 
it resonated with basic presuppositions concerning human being that remain to this 
day widely distributed amongst all political persuasions. Rose (1990: 151) sums up 
these presuppositions regarding the self as follows: the self is to
• be a subjective being;
• aspire to autonomy;
• strive for personal fulfilment in its earthly life;
• interpret its reality and destiny as a matter of individual responsibility;
• find meaning in its existence by shaping its life through acts of choice.
The charting of the rise of the dominant discourse of self is echoed by Bauman 
(2000, 2009). For Bauman (2000: 21-2) the process of individualisation, at the 
heart of self-development, essentially ‘consists of transforming human identity from 
a ‘given into a task’, and charging the actors with the responsibility for performing 
that task and for the consequences (also the side-effects) of their performance’. This 
task centred, goal orientation has put the self into process but is defining it by the 
end result. In its application to social work, this enterprising notion of the continually 
improving, accountable, responsible, choosing and autonomous self is written into 
the journey in the competence framework. Professional capabilities for progression 
to advanced practitioner, practice educator and social work manager have a process 
but goal orientated definition of the self, defined by external structures.
The arrival of a departure of the postmodern where the deconstruction and 
reconstruction of the self is fluid, fragmentary, discontinuous, decentred, dispersed, 
culturally eclectic and hybrid-like (Elliott & du Gay, 2009; p.xii). The argument 
for the destruction of the self is in the wake of the collapse of the modernist grand 
narratives of reason, truth, progress and universal freedom. For example, Bauman 
(2009) emphasises the decentred character of the self in the wider circuit of 
globalisation. The ‘atomization and privatization of life struggles, self-propelling 
and self-perpetuating,’ are where the interior life of the subject, the self, became 
coterminous with the supremacy of the signifier. As Parton and O’Byrne (2000: 42) 
suggest ‘there has been a general shift in our conceptions of the nature of human 
beings in the Western world from a social subject of solidarity and citizenship to, in 
more recent years, the autonomous subject of choice, self-realisation and self-agency’.
Rose (1990: 3) argues the image of the self has come under question both practically 
and conceptually. The self is ‘coherent, bounded individualised, intentional, the 
locus of thought, action, and belief, the origin of its own actions, the beneficiary of 
a unique biography’. This fixed and frozen entity of identity of our history, heritage 
and experience, characterised by a profound inwardness of a regulatory ideal of an 
‘internal universe of the self’ has undergone contemporary challenge. For example, the 
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self has been technologically invaded, turned outwards and inwards, supplemented 
and amended, to the point where Harraway (1991) refers to the ‘cyborg’ self.
The ‘individualised self’ under modernisation and the emergent discourse of the 
twentieth century is captured by Geertz (1979: 229) who states that,
[t]he Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated 
motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgement 
and action, organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against other such 
wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may 
seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of world’s cultures.
There is a wealth of localised, specific, culturally diverse and contested notions 
of the self. The rigidity and lack of temporal understanding of the self is, as Charles 
Taylor suggests, ‘a function of a historically limited mode of self interpretation, one 
which has become dominant in the modern West and which may indeed spread 
thence to other parts of the globe, but which has a beginning in time and space and 
may have an end’ (Taylor, 1989: 111).
Reflexively, we can recognise that the individual self is located within a number of 
technological discourses derived from education, social psychology, and professional 
practice. Reflection on the historical development of this idea such as in the work 
of Foucault (2007, 2002, 1988, 1984, 1981) examines and explores the competing 
and conflicting technologies at work on the self.
By historicising questions of ontology, Foucault’s understanding of self found 
expression in his emphasis upon power, from the Latin, posse, to be able, as a 
productive force, and its relationship with particular inventions of ‘the self’. As Rose 
(1990: 152) indicates, ‘the autonomous subjectivity of the modern self’ may seem 
the antithesis of political power, but Foucault (1984a, 1984b, 1984c, 1981 [1976]) 
suggests an exploration of the ways in which this autonomisation of the self is a 
central feature of contemporary ‘governmentality’ or ‘modalities of government’. Rose’s 
notion of governmentality encompasses ‘the multiple strategies, tactics, calculations, 
and reflections that have sought’ to orchestrate ‘the conduct of human beings’ (Rose 
1990: 152). The ‘contact between technologies of domination of others and those of 
the self’ is what Foucault (1988: 19) calls governmentality. The development of the 
self is always in danger of being rendered as one such tactic of governmentality. An 
emerging critical approach to the powers of government in relation to the self (Dean 
2010; Foucault 2007) provides two productive avenues of exploration.
Technologies of the self are the methods, techniques and ‘tools’ by which human 
beings constitute themselves. These are the forms of knowledge and strategies that 
‘permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others, a certain 
number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of 
being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality’ (Foucault 1988: 19).
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In his later writings Foucault’s historicist analysis of power as a productive social 
force provides a particular focus upon The Technologies of the Self
 
and suggests a 
heterogeneous range of techniques of subjectification through which human beings 
are urged to become more ethical beings.
 
Foucault’s writings imply that amongst 
individuals such techniques provide grounds for defining their identities and in 
regulating themselves in accordance with the moral codes inscribed within the space 
produced by the institutional apparatus of the professions and higher education.
Throughout his work Foucault has concerned himself largely with the technologies 
of power and domination, whereby the self has been objectified through scientific 
inquiry and how the self constitutes itself as subject (Foucault, 1988). He also argues 
that ‘know thyself’ ‘constitutes the fundamental principles’ and has inverted the 
importance of ‘take care of yourself’.
Foucault understood technologies of the self as a multiplicity of ‘operations on 
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and way of being’ that people make 
either by themselves or with the help of others, so opening the possibility of reaching 
a state of ‘happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or immortality’ (Foucault, 1988: 
18). In the context of social work, this can be interpreted as particular operations 
on the body of students that are undertaken by the students themselves, sometimes 
with the support of others in order to enhance the wisdom of their actions in making 
inquiries about an aspect of their own professional work.
Development of the self therefore embodies two inter-related dimensions of 
means-ends structured technologies of the self: the first stage is already predicated 
upon an ordering of human beings involved in accordance with the rationality of 
its own particular protocols. Secondly, in agreement with the ordering of theoretical 
reason (Heidegger, 1962) the precise locus for the human being is found to be one 
of a multiplicity of possible technological ‘inventions’ we call the self mediated by 
the discourses in which it may have been thrown in practice.
As a subject, the self is not defined by a series of characteristic attributes or 
behaviours, but is constituted by technology. As an objectivised subject the self has 
become dominated by technologies of power to which human beings have already 
submitted themselves. But, Foucault was not inviting us to accept such technologies 
of the self as a deterministic process from which we cannot escape (although he 
presents limited possibilities for resistance) but his writings provide testimony to 
his questioning of the origins of such technologies. Foucault’s (2002 [1966]) desire 
had been already made tangible in his earlier writings in The Order of Things to help 
his readers free themselves from understandings of the self as a subject. In his first 
chapter, ‘Las Meninas’, Foucault brings to the attention of his readers the painter, 
Velazquez’s, pictorial opening to The Order of Things, in which ‘the subject is elided’ 
(2002:18). In one short chapter the very existence of the subject is open to question 
and his work problematises any finality of a fixed self and this self, just as it has been 
created, can be erased.
Having posited the possibility of the self constituted by technologies and discourse 
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or the disciplining knowledge, power and practices in Western philosophical 
tradition, the discussion will now turn to the profession of social work and social 
work education. The conception of self in social work is developed to examine this 
area of professional practice. The self is ‘framed’ in various discourses as a relational 
and positioned self.
The self in social work
(Shaw 1974: 102) suggests one of the problems with considering topics like the self, 
self-concept, self-esteem and self-actualisation within social work, is the feeling that 
in so doing we are practicing a form of narcissism or self-actualisation. It is also highly 
conducive to a neo-liberal agenda where conceptions of the self become an objectified 
and commodified continual process of improvement. Shaw (1974: 102) argues that 
conception of the self and its consideration ‘is a concern with self-development’ 
and there is nothing intrinsically or ethically wrong with ‘constructive self-concern’. 
Indeed, this carries echoes for the reflective practitioner of ancient Greek wisdom to 
‘know thyself’, although Foucault has historicised this ontological development and 
the individualising discourse of self in social work is seen to emerge.
The self as a process of self-actualisation is seen in the work of Maslow, Rogers, 
Jung, Reich, and Allport (Shaw 1974). All have contributed to a codified notion of 
the self as embedded in a linear process of progress to some actualisable ending - a 
static and frozen movement of the individual in a quest for self-actualisation. This 
sequential and progressive notion of the self has developed in ‘self-theory’ (Shaw 
1974), underwrites the competency framework and has distinct applications for 
social work practice and education. Shaw (1974) suggests the history of social work 
also echoes the development of self-theory. It begins with a ‘soul-searching’ of the 
beginnings of social work in philanthropy and charitable trusts of the nineteenth 
century, and working through the application of interventions, group work, hierarchy 
of needs and the way that self-actualisation theory ‘is primarily a challenge to oneself’ 
(Shaw, 1974: 103). The conceptualisation of the self although reflective in part has 
a deeply ingrained telos and progressive development to an achievable state of self 
knowledge and self-realisation. Shaw locates and positions Rogers (1965), Argyris 
(1965) and Maslow (1954) in this self-actualising tendency that are consistent with 
the existing structures, organisation and socialisation of the ‘self’. This self consists 
of sets of attitudes and beliefs, the filter through which experience is mediated, the 
framework of meanings and guides for action.
Contemporary and seminal social work is informed by Coulshed and Orme’s 
(2006) work that states, professional social work practice requires that workers deploy 
a wide-ranging repertoire of skills, underpinned by a value base that respects others’, 
‘to respond to the diversity and experiences and reactions that are encountered when 
THE SELF IN SOCIAL WORK
111
working with fellow human beings’ (Coulshed & Orme, 2006: 18). Even with the 
recognition of the complex interaction between knowledge and process, challenging 
notions of who produces knowledge, how it is used and what the implications for 
practice are, they still conceive of the social worker as a self that has strong echoes 
with an individualised self, cognisant of relationships and others, but focused on 
the unstable and historically contingent self.
Harrison and Ruch (2007) suggest there is a heightened trend since the late 1980s 
that places less importance on the ‘self’ in social work practice and education although 
any reference to the ‘self’ does not appear in National Occupational Standards with 
an attendant danger of a ‘self-less’ approach resorting to ‘doing’ rather than ‘being’ 
social workers. The professional discourse and technologies at work on the self in 
social work bring the doing self through technologies of performance rather than 
the being self.
Social worker’s use of self has been conceptualised in different ways throughout 
the literature, there appears to be a lack of research regarding how social workers 
describe and involve the self that they bring to their therapeutic and non-therapeutic 
work (Reupert, 2007). In interviews about their experience of self, practitioners 
described the self that they brought to their work as individualistic, though at the 
same time stressed the importance of self when interacting with others. Since the 
inception of social work social workers have noted the importance of relationship in 
practice. More recently clinicians and other social workers have developed the term 
‘use of self’ to indicate important aspects of the professional relationship. How that 
term is defined rests on how one conceptualises ‘self’. From a relational perspective 
the concept of self changes from the notion of self as separate and constant to self as 
process in interaction (Arnd-Caddigan & Pozzuto, 2008). This move has the positive 
development of a recognition of the fluidity and flexibility of the self but neglects 
any recognition of the technologies at work defining the self as an object to be 
manipulated and disciplined within the professional practice.
Conducting case-study, narrative accounts through semi-structured interviews 
(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009), participants in small scale research project provided a 
‘story of self’ that attempts to secure a centered and fixed notion of self. Participants 
discussed their journey into social work to provide a narrative of their emergence sense 
of self. As these stories materialise, the conflicting sense of self between professional 
discourses, the fluidity of self, and the formative process of self were reported. 
The importance of credentials and the institutional definition of ‘who people are’ 
were seen as significant as were the ‘maturational process’ in the aging process in 
professional practice. The time spent in practice and the recognition of being seen 
as part of this professional group were also seen as important in peoples’ disclosure 
and construction of self. The process of entry into professional practice was seen as 
definitive on arriving at a stable sense of self. For example, joining Post-Qualifying 
courses present a destabilising sense of self until one is reformed around a social 
work informed value base and an emerging sense of self in professional practice. The 
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interviews suggest that people arrived with an individual sense of self but through 
the process of social work training and practice their position shifts. For example, 
one respondent suggests that,
In the sense that … contrasting myself to [other professions such as education] … I 
was very sure that I identified myself as a social worker’. ‘I felt then that I was a social 
worker through and through, like a stick of rock.
The relational sense of self comes from critical incidents or ‘tipping points’ where 
individual engage in a new direction or course of action. One respondent, entering 
teaching social work from practice suggests that,
Starting a professional doctorate, submitting an article define you and your worthiness 
within the [professional] community … [it] confirmed my role and identity.
Respondents also reported that in the process of ‘becoming’ a social worker 
it was the relationships they established with fellow trainee colleagues and with 
experienced workers that was important. For example, one respondent suggests 
that the professional relationship she established with a social work lecturer while 
conducting her CQSW to her Masters and to her PhD, was incredibly significant. The 
relationship-based self, progressed and developed to become a formative moment in a 
professional sense of self. The fascinating ‘stories of self’, in an initial case-study pilot 
project of semi-structured interviews, will form the basis of future, ongoing work.
Social workers have been identified as ‘instruments of change’ (Heydt and Sherman 
2005). The conscious use of self is the term used by social workers to describe the 
skill of purposefully and intentionally using ‘his or her motivation and capacity to 
communicate and interact with others in ways that facilitate change’ (Sheafor and 
Horejsi 2003: 69). From an American perspective, they argue conscious use of self is 
not a new concept in social work. Various authors (Lee 1983; Leiby 1997; Jacobson 
2001) have identified the shift in social work from its early emphasis on social 
reform to its current emphasis on clinical practice also appears to have shifted the 
focus from conscious use of self at multiple levels of intervention to self-awareness 
within a one-on-one helping relationship. It has also turned the process from an 
experiential exploration of ‘self’ to an instrument of practice. Arguably, this move has 
moved a conflicting and multiple notion of self to a fixed, technologically determined 
and discursively constructed objective instrument. Neuman and Friedman (1997) 
emphasise the importance of self-awareness and conscious use of self in the building 
of the relationship by identifying two key ingredients: self-awareness through mastery 
of one’s feelings and motivations as well as understanding how one is perceived 
by clients. Presenting a simple and linear causal connection Heydt and Sherman 
(2005) argue the worker’s skill in this process builds the relationship with client to 
deliver outcomes for practice. Reviewing a range of teaching strategies, (role-play, 
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visual methodologies, case-studies, videoing, self-reflection), Heydt and Sherman 
(2005: 35) argue for conscious use of the self as a ‘tuning one own’s instrument’, 
although they do recognise risks in self-disclosure and the need for boundaries 
and confidentiality. Arguably, this move to the instrumentality of self deepens and 
strengthens the technological determination of self in social work.
Similarly, Jacobson (2001: 55) argues ‘clinical practitioners are taught that self-
knowledge is vital to detecting transference, counter transference, and other dynamics 
in the therapeutic relationship’. But, although key to therapeutic practice, such efforts 
to ‘know oneself’ have not been emphasised as a foundation for non-clinical social 
work activities, such as income maintenance work, employment training, child 
welfare, or nutritional support. Using the ‘conscious use’ of the self, the self is seen 
as a necessary precondition for becoming an instrument of change.
Miehls and Moffat (2000) suggest the social work identity is conceptualised based 
on concepts of the self (Foucault, 1988), rather than concepts associated with 
ego psychology. Social work students, teachers and practitioners have historically 
attempted to gain a sense of ego mastery and control by the acquisition of theory to 
enhance skill-based practice expertise. In so doing, they have attempted to manage 
anxiety as a means to enhance learning. Traditional social work functions such as 
acceptance, non-judgemental attitudes, and empathy (Biestek, 1957) have been 
utilised to encourage practitioners to manage their feelings related to difference. 
Miehls and Moffat (2000) argue, however, that the social work identity is enriched when 
social workers allow their selves to be in a state of disassembly in the presence of the 
other. When social workers experience their selves as complex and dialogical, they 
are more open to the influence of the other and they make the case for practitioners 
to work on a reflexive self rather than attempting to achieve ego control through the 
management of anxiety.
So it would appear that the self in social work has moved from the self-theory 
of self-actualisation, to a relational self constituted by others, elided from official 
discourses, constructed as an instrument of change and presented in an anxious 
state of disassembly. These competing and potentially conflicting notions of ‘self’, 
have a significant role in social work education and the opportunity for student 
practitioners to explore the ‘self’.
Social work education and experiential and reflective 
learning
Ruch (2000) presents an argument of the self in reflective learning using a narrative, 
auto-ethnographic approach. Ruch (2000) explores the key themes of holistic 
approaches to learning, the significance of the self and multiple subjectivities, the 
personal in the professional, and the importance of attending to the process and 
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content of learning. Examples of shortcomings in institutional learning environment 
are included and drawn on to highlight the potential for more reflective approaches 
within the social work education system. Ruch (2000) suggests that given the anxiety-
provoking nature of the situations student practitioners face, they need to embrace 
reflective learning if they are to avoid becoming restrictive, routinised and ritualistic 
in their practice. The use of the self in research in social work practice has focused 
on the qualitative methodologies of auto/ethnography and narrative approaches to 
understanding of reflexive practice in social work education.
The resurgent interest in the professional relationship can partly be understood 
as a response to the neo-liberal agenda of economically driven and managerially 
dominated practice contexts that foster a reductive perception of individuals as 
rational consumers or commissioners of service (Harrison and Ruch 2007: 44). In the 
current climate, with the pressures of the age of austerity, it is anticipated that further 
reduction in any focus on the self in the relationship-based helping professions will 
ensue. The demands of cost effectiveness, values for money, target driven economically 
determined service evaluation will further exacerbate the eliding of the subject, 
the reduction to a parsimonious self, and a diminished ability to re-invigorate the 
importance of the self in helping. Alternatively, a conceptualisation of a the self in a 
different voice (Gilligan 1982) or based on a ‘caring relationships’ (Noddings 1984) 
focuses on ‘relational self’ where the self is a moral agent not detached and ‘atomistic’ 
but embedded in concrete social relationships acquiring moral identity through 
interactions. The self is constructed and maintained reflectively using expertise and 
experience for creating an active community for decision making that is collectively 
accountable with engagement and commitment from all and using the self as part 
of the process.
The centrality of emotions, ‘care’, communication, interpretation, dialogue, and 
being with the ‘other’ provide a unity of hand, head and heart rather than a detached 
atomistic rational agent or an anti-intellectual practitioner. The value base is from 
a situated ethics that can attend to a ‘plurality of voices’ of equally valued selves in 
conversation. As such this notion of self and the importance of relationships meets 
the needs of social work in Powell’s (2001: 67) suggestion ‘…social work’s value 
system is located in the classical humanist notion of a virtuous society, based upon 
a commitment to humanity, equality and social justice, rather than the vagaries of 
fortune that define market capitalism’ and Cree (2000: 28) assertion that ‘social 
work has a long tradition of working alongside people, valuing difference and having 
concern for social justice and inequality. These are the aspects of social work that we 
must build on in the future wherever social work is located’. A valued and relational 
self is part of this contributory and positive process.
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Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the changing nature of social work practice and the historic 
understanding of conceptions of the self. The application of conceptions of the 
self to social work, social work practice and social work education suggests three 
dominant themes that emerge in relation to the self. A North American conception 
of the ‘conscious use of the self as an instrument of change’, a UK based ‘use of the 
self’ and a focus on the disassembly of the self. It has been suggested that both these 
conceptions carry with them the implicit difficulties of the objectifying process of 
instrumental rationality that distances ‘social work’ from the richness, diversity and 
insight of subjectivities, positionality, explorations of the self in a helping process 
through the value of experiential and reflective learning. These forms of learning need 
to form the platform for future work based learning and inform the curricula of all 
forms of social practice in social work and social care. Pedagogical experience and 
insight should create space for moments of a disassembled self to explore conception 
of the self being employed in professional practice. The social work education and 
practice needs to take account of the mobility of self in its engagement with the 
everyday and the fluidity and relational nature of the conception of the self rather 
than the absent or fixed current self.
References.
Adams, J. M., Jones, W. H. (1999) (Eds.) Handbook of Interpersonal Commitment and 
Relationship Stability. New York: Humana Press
Argyris, C. (1965). Personality and Organisation. London: Harper and Row
Arnd-Caddigan, M. and Pozzuto, R. (2008). Use of Self in Relational Clinical Social Work, 
Clinical Social Work Journal, 36 (3): 235-243, DOI: 10.1007/s10615-007-0103-7
Banks, S. (2004) Ethics, Accountability and the Social Professions. London: Palgrave
Bauman, Z. (2009). Identity in a Globalizing World. in A. Elliott and P. du Gay (Eds.). Identity 
in Question (1-12). London: Sage
Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press
Bogg, D. (2010) Values and Ethics in Mental Health Practice: Post-qualifying social work practice. 
Exeter: Learning Matters
Burkitt, I. (2008). Social Selves. London: Sage
Care Standards Improvement Partnership / National Institute for Mental Health England. 
(2006) The Social Work Contribution to Mental Health Services. London: TSO
Coulshed, V. and Orme, J. (4th ed.) (2006). Social Work Practice. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Cree, V. (2000) ‘The Changing nature of Social Work’ in Adams, R., Dominelli, L. and Payne, 
M. (eds) Critical Practice in Social Work. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Dean, M. (2010). (2nd
 
Ed.) Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society London: Sage 
ADAM BARNARD
116
Publications
Department of Health. (2007) New Ways of Working for Everyone. London: TSO
Department of Health (2010) Relational Security Explorer. London: TSO
Department of Health (2010a) See, Think, Act. London: TSO
Descartes, R. (1968 [1637]). Trans. F.E. Sutcliffe. Discourse on Method and the Mediations. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin
Du Gay, P. (2007). Organising Identity; Persons and Organisations ‘After Theory’. London: Sage
Elliott, A. (2007). (2nd ed) Concepts of the Self. Cambridge: Polity
Elliott, A. & du Gay, P. (2009). Identity in Question. London: Sage
Elvin, M. (1985). Between the earth and heaven: concepts of the self in China. in M. Carrithers, 
S. Collins and S. Lukes. (Eds.). The Category of the Person: Anthropology, philosophy, history. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Foucault, M. (1981 [1976]). The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, The Will to Knowledge. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin
Foucault, M. (1984a). Power: Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, Volume 3, trans. R. 
Hurley & others, J D. Faubion (Ed.). New York: The New Press
Foucault, M. (1984b). The History of Sexuality, Volume 2, The Use Of Pleasure. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin
Foucault, M. (1984c). The History of Sexuality, Volume 3, The Care of the Self.. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin
Foucault, M. (1988) Technologies of the Self: A seminar with Michel Foucault. (edited by 
Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, Patrick H. Hutton). Amherst, Mass.: University of 
Massachusetts Press
Foucault, M. (2002 [1966]). The Order of Things, London and New York: Routledge
Foucault, M. (2007). Security, Territory, Population. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Geertz, C. (1979). Form the native’s point of view: On the nature of anthropological 
understanding. in P. Rabinow and W.M. Sullivan (Eds.) Interpretive Social Science. Berkeley: 
University of California Press (pp.225-242)
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity. Cambridge: Polity
Gill, C. (2006). The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman thought. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press
Harraway, D. (1991). A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, technology and socialist feminism in the 
late twentieth century. in D. Harraway (Ed.) Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The re-invention 
of nature. New York: Routledge (pp.149-181)
Harrison, K. and Ruch, G. (2007). Social work and the use of self: on becoming and 
being a social worker. In Lymbery, Mark E.F. and Postle, Karen (Eds.) Social Work: A 
companion to learning. London: Sage
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell
Heydt, M. J. and Sherman, N. E. (2005). Conscious Use of Self: Tuning the Instrument of 
social work practice with cultural competence. The Journal of Baccalaureate Social Work, 
10, 2, 25-40
International Federation of Social Work (2011) ‘Definition of social work’. Available at: http://
THE SELF IN SOCIAL WORK
117
www.ifsw.org/f38000138.html. Last Accessed 1.2.12
Jacobson, W. B. (2001). Beyond therapy: Bringing social work back to human services reform. 
Social Work, 46, 1, 51-62
Jones, A. (2006). Self/image: Technology, representation, and the contemporary subject. London: 
Routledge
Johnson, K. and Williams, I. (2007) Managing Uncertainty and Change in Social Work and 
Social Care. London: Random House
Kant, I. (1966 [1791]). Critique of Pure Reason. Trans.F. Max Müller. New York: Anchor Books
Kvale, S. and Brinkmann, S. (2009) Interviews: Learning the craft of qualitative research 
interviewing. London: Sage
Kenny, A. (1968). Descartes: A study of his philosophy. New York: Random House
Kroner, S. (1955). Kant. Harmondsworth: Penguin
Lee, L. (1983). The social worker in the political environment of a school system. Social 
Work, July/August 302-307
Leiby, J. (1997). Social work and social responsibility. in M. Reisch & E. Gambrill (Eds.) Social 
Work in the 21st century. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.  (pp. 359-367)
Marcus, C. C. (2006). House as mirror of self: exploring the deeper meaning of home. Berwick, 
Maine: Nicolas-Hays
Marx, K. (1990 [1848]). The Communist Manifesto. London: Verso
Maslow, A. (1954). Motivation and Personality. London: Harper and Row
McCoyd, J.L.M. (2010) Social work in Health Settings: Practice in context. Abingdon; Rooutledge
Merchant, C. ( 2007) Matching skills to need. Mental Health Today, Apri, 23-25
Miehls, D. and Moffatt, K. (2000). Constructing social work identity based on the reflexive 
self, British Journal of Social Work, 30, 339-348
Munro, E. (2011) The Munro Review of Child Protection. London: TSO
Neuman, K. M. & Friedman, B. D. (1997). Process recordings: Fine-tuning an old instrument, 
Journal of Social Work Education, 33, 2, 23 7-243
Nietzsche, F. (1974 [1882]). The Gay Science. Trans W. Kaufmann. London: Vintage
Parton, N. and O’Byrne, P. (2000) The Constructive Social Worker. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Parrot, L . (2006) Values and Ethics in Social Work Practice. (1st ed.) Exeter: Learning Matters
Parrot, L.  (2010) Values and Ethics in Social Work Practice. (2nd ed.) Exeter: Learning Matters
Powell, F. (2001) The Politics of Social Work. London: Sage
Ray, M. Pugh, R. Roberts, D. and Beech, B. (2008) Mental Health and Social Work. SCIE 
Research Briefing 26. London: SCIE
Rogers, C. (1965). Client-Centred Therapy. London: Houghton Mifflin
Rose, N. (1990). Governing the Soul: The shaping of the private self. London: Routledge
Ruch, G. (2000). Self and social work: Towards an integrated model of learning. Journal of 
Social Work Practice, 14, 2, 99-112
Reupert, A. (2007). Social Worker’s Use of Self. Clinical Social Work Journal, 35,  2, 107-116, 
DOI: 10.1007/s10615-006-0062-4
Scottish Executive (2006) Changing Lives: Report of the 21st Century Social Work Review. 
Available at:
ADAM BARNARD
118
 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/04/07112629/6. Last Accessed 1.2.12
Seigel, J. (2005). The Idea of the Self: Thought and experience in Western Europe since the seventh 
century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Shaw, J. (1974). The Self in Social Work. London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul
Sheafor, B. W, and Horejsi, C. R. (2003). (6th ed.) Techniques and Guidelines for Social Work 
Practice. Boston: Allyn & Bacon
Social Work Task Force. (2009a) Facing up to the Task: The Interim Report of the Social Work 
Task Force. London: DoH / DCSF
Social Work Task Force. (2009b) Building a Safe, Confident Future: The Final Report of the Social 
Work Task Force. London: DoH / DCSF
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the Self: The making of modern identity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press
Thomas, M. and Pierson, J. (2006). (2nd ed.) Collins Internet-linked Dictionary of Social Work. 
Glasgow: HarperCollins.
